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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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AUGUST 6, 1944

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BULLETIN

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Research and Publication, Office of Public Information, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest is included.

Publications of the Department, cumulative lists of which are published at the end of each quarter, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.

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Position of British Government on Argentine Problem

Statement by THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

[Released to the press August 2]

Requested to comment on the British Prime Minister's statement of August 2 on Argentina in the House of Commons, Acting Secretary Stettinius said:

"The statement by Prime Minister Churchill in the House of Commons today in which he expressed regret that the Government of Argentina 'has chosen to dally with evil' and 'has not seen fit

to declare herself wholeheartedly, unmistakably and with no reserve and qualification on the side of freedom' is truly of great importance.

"The Prime Minister's statement goes to the very heart of the Argentine problem. He has clearly and forcefully expressed the common position of the British Government and of all of the governments which have refrained from recognizing the Farrell regime."

International Peace and Security Organization

[Released to the press August 1]

The Acting Secretary of State on August 1 made the following announcement:

The informal conversations on international organization for peace and security between representatives of this Government, representatives of the United Kingdom, and representatives of the Soviet Union will begin on the morning of August 14 at Dumbarton Oaks. After the conclusion of these conversations representatives of this Government, representatives of the United Kingdom, and representatives of China will conduct similar conversations on the same subject at the same place.

As has already been indicated in prior announcements, the forthcoming conversations will be exploratory and informal in

nature. Those who will from time to time participate with me in different phases of these conversations will be drawn from the following list of persons who have been assisting the Secretary of State on the subject of international organization and security: Messrs. Isaiah Bowman, Benjamin V. Cohen, James Clement Dunn, Henry P. Fletcher, Joseph C. Grew, Green H. Hackworth,

Stanley K. Hornbeck, Breckinridge Long, Leo Pasvolosky, and Edwin C. Wilson; Lt. Gen. Stanley D. Embick, Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, Maj. Gen. Muir S. Fairchild, Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn, Vice Admiral Russell Willson, and Rear Admiral Harold C. Train. This Government will furnish whatever secretariat may be needed for the efficient conduct of the conversations.

Severance by Turkey of Relations With Germany

[Released to the press August 2]

This Government welcomes as a step toward full cooperation with the United Nations in their struggle against Nazi aggression the decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on August 2 to sever diplomatic and economic relations with Germany.

Death of Foreign Minister of Spain

[Released to the press August 4]

The following message has been sent to His Excellency Don José Pan de Soraluce y Español, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, by Acting Secretary Stettinius:

On behalf of my Government and on my own behalf I wish to express my deep regret at the untimely death of Count Jordana. Please convey to Countess Jordana and to her family my sincere condolences. The Secretary, who is away from the Department for a few days, has personally asked that his deepest sympathy be included in this message.

EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR.
Acting Secretary of State

[Released to the press August 4]

The news of Count Jordana's death has been received with great regret by officials of this Government.

Count Jordana became Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain for the second time in September 1942, two months prior to the Allied landings in North Africa. He took a leading part in bringing about prompt acceptance by the Spanish Government of Allied guarantees to Spain conveyed by President Roosevelt to General Franco and communicated to the latter by Ambassador Hayes in Madrid.

When the Spanish Government failed to obtain equivalent guarantees from the Germans, Count Jordana likewise took a leading part in warning the Germans that Spain would resist any effort on their part to cross the Spanish territory in an attempt to close the Straits of Gibraltar to our forces.

This Government conducted a series of important negotiations with Count Jordana which brought great benefits to the Spanish people as well as to the United States and its Allies. The recent wolfram negotiations were outstanding in this category.

With Count Jordana's cooperation many thousands of Allied and stateless refugees who had escaped from Nazi oppression and entered Spain, most of them clandestinely, were evacuated with American assistance to destinations of their choice.

Meetings on Post-War Telecommunications Problems

[Released to the press August 4]

The Department of State has issued invitations to meetings to be held on August 11 and 12, 1944 in Washington to consider certain problems involving post-war telecommunications, particularly with a view to international telecommunications conferences, some of which it is anticipated may be held within a year, and others immediately following the conclusion of the war.

The Department has circulated documents about which the meetings of August 11 and 12 will primarily revolve. They include possible revision of the International Telecommunications Convention of Madrid, 1932, and of the International General Radio Regulations of Cairo, 1938, as well as a proposed revision of the frequency spectrum.

These documents are not put forward as having approval of all United States Government agencies concerned but rather are designed for use as a basis of discussion between government and industry at the forthcoming meetings. It is the hope of the Department that proposals will also be submitted by members of industry and by other United States Government agencies looking toward the most complete collaboration between Government and industry and toward appropriate international conferences, so that the plans ultimately worked out will be in the best interest of all the public and private American agencies involved.

Death of President Quezon

Statement by THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

[Released to the press August 1]

I have learned with profound regret of the death of President Quezon. His passing is a great shock to all of us in the Department and is a very great loss both to the Filipino people and the people of the United States. Throughout his life President Quezon was a staunch friend of the United States and gave this country unstinted loyalty and cooperation. His passing at this moment is especially sad when he was working in connection with the post-war planning for the independence of the Philippines and when he was counting upon his early return to his native land.

World Affairs in Three Dimensions

Address by ASSISTANT SECRETARY BERLE¹

[Released to the press August 3]

This talk tonight is merely to set out some of the new problems which modern science is throwing up to the Department of State. They can be summed up in a sentence. They are the problems of a world of three dimensions instead of the old problems of the flat map we knew in our school days. We are seeing, today, the end of the flat map.

When most of us were in school, practically all international problems were on the surface of the earth or the surface of the sea. You could stop intercourse between nations by putting up a fence on any boundary. Many boundaries, in fact, literally did have fences, with gates where the roads crossed from one country to another.

The greatest gift a government can give its people is to keep war away from their soil. Accordingly, these boundaries or fences were protected. Sometimes protection consisted of a line of fortresses, like the line between France and Germany, or still later the Maginot Line by which, we all remember, France hoped to keep Hitler out. Where a country had the sea as a boundary, it defended there, too, with naval fleets, coast guns, and so forth. In World War I, in which I served as second lieutenant, the entire strategy was built on national boundaries and how to fortify and defend them.

But in our own time that whole situation has changed. It began, I suppose, when the Wright brothers first flew their experimental plane, the *Kitty Hawk*; one wonders whether they knew what changes they were going to make in the world's history and the fate of empires.

Now there is no fence high enough or strong enough to keep out aircraft; the aeronautical engineers have learned how to fly to the upper reaches of the air itself. No gun has range enough to shoot that high. And there are not airplanes enough in the world to stop all the enemy aircraft at the borders.

This is simple to say. What this is doing to world affairs is not so simple.

The strongest and biggest power in the world

can no longer guarantee that an enemy shall not cross its border and bomb its cities. You can make it dangerous and expensive for the other fellow to do it, because you can cross the border in his country, too; and if you have more planes and more bombs than he does you can see that he gets the worst of the exchange. But that is not the same thing as being able to tell your country that no one can touch it. There are, of course, limits to what airplanes can do. But we now have robot bombs, which are really flying torpedoes. They are harder to shoot down than airplanes, though a good many are being shot down by British, Canadian, and American fighter planes on the English coast. But if you really want to stop them you have to get back into your enemy's country and smash the emplacement from which he shoots them.

What that means is that an enemy can sit deep in his own country, building these machines, and without moving can shoot them across his boundary, and perhaps across two or three small countries in between, hitting you or some other country a great many miles away.

The old flat map is still there. There may still be a fence on the national boundary. But the robot never heard of a map and wouldn't know a frontier if it met one.

During the same period in which the airplane and the robot bomb are making international fences look old-fashioned another scientific development is going on which is making even more trouble for the flat map. This is the science of using electric wavelengths, like the wavelengths which are bringing this broadcast to you tonight. Being no scientist, I don't try to explain how it is done; but we all know, fairly well, what is being done, and we can guess some more things that will be done in the future. You can, by using electricity, set up electric waves which will go all over the earth. A national boundary is just nothing in their lives. These waves go straight through most fences, just as some of your radios have no

¹ Delivered on the "World Statesmen" program over the facilities of station WMCA and the Atlantic network, Aug. 3, 1944.

aerials and yet the wavelengths come right into your room. Development along this line has fortunately been mainly peaceful: wireless messages, radio, and radiotelephones, with television coming along. Yet in international affairs the flat map took its worst and biggest beating at this point. You can be sovereign of the air if you like; but the most sovereign country can no more stop a radio wave from coming into its borders than King Canute in the old legend could order the tide to stop rising.

These waves could carry music, speeches or commercial messages, and pictures. They also can carry propaganda and signals to the fifth columns.

Can they do anything else? We don't yet know. They can tell a good distance away whether an airplane or ship is coming toward you. At present this use of radio waves—now called "radar"—is still in its infancy.

There are other scientific experiments going on today which will add still further to our problems; but they can wait for another time. The two sets of questions raised by the air and the wavelengths through the earth are enough to keep us busy for a while. What will they do to your life and mine—and still more to the lives of the children who are just coming along? What happens when the flat map of our school days begins to crumple up?

Well, the first thing that happens is that you begin thinking about other countries. You have to. If a fellow far outside your country can build a concrete rigging from which he can land a rocket contraption loaded with high explosive in your backyard, you become somewhat interested in that other fellow. You want to know whether, when he starts building something out of concrete, it is a football stadium or a rocket-bomb emplacement.

You can have a fair guess as to what he is thinking. You can listen in on his radio to what his government is saying and what his news-people are saying. He and his friends are perhaps listening in on you and your friends, wondering, just as you are, what the international weather looks like.

You no longer feel quite so sure that safety depends on a couple of oceans. You probably know

that planes already in existence—the *Constellation*, for instance—can cross the Atlantic in about seven hours. If you had the luck to look on some of the drawing-boards in some of the laboratories you would see designs for planes which probably could cross the Atlantic in far less time. A few years from now the Atlantic Ocean will no more save the United States from trouble than the English Channel saves the British Isles tonight.

And so you begin to think, perhaps, of world organization. The boys on the beachheads in Normandy are fighting to smash this present attack. But it will take something more than victory to stop this from happening again. The United States has not seen a foreign foe on its soil for more than a century and a quarter, thanks to the flat map. But the flat map is no longer a going concern. So we have to start working at the business of keeping the peace, at the business of helping to work with other nations so that no one of them shall break the peace, so that everyone can be reasonably sure at all times that the men in all the countries working with the concrete mixers are building dwelling-houses or peaceful factories, not rocket emplacements.

Practically everyone in the world wants a system of international peace. But not everybody has made up his mind to do the things that have to be done if war is going to be prevented. The maintenance of peace does mean use of force from time to time. It does mean that while looking out for yourself you give the other fellow a chance to live and sell his goods. It does mean settling quarrels by law instead of by fifth columns and rocket bombs. It means making international agreements about a lot of things—air and communications and commerce and trade. Some of these were not agreements you thought you had to make in earlier days; but those were the days when you could put up your fence on your flat map and forget about the man on the other side of it.

You are living with that man now: at long distance, but at close range. You and he, and millions of people like us and like him, are neighbors, whether they like it or not. We cannot escape the task of building a system of good neighbors.

Allied Control Commission for Italy¹

The armistice with Italy provided for a Control Commission to regulate and execute the terms of the armistice under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander. On November 10, 1943 General Eisenhower announced the establishment of the Allied Control Commission for Italy to assume "the duty of carrying out the terms of the armistice and of aligning Italian economy in complete support of the United Nations fight against Germany". The president of the Allied Control Commission is the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson. General Wilson has delegated his authority as president of the Control Commission to General Alexander, the Allied Theater Commander in Italy. The active head of the Control Commission, however, is the deputy president or chief commissioner, as he is more commonly referred to, who was, until his recent resignation for reasons of health, Lt. Gen. Noel Mason-MacFarlane, former Governor of Gibraltar. General Mason-MacFarlane's immediate assistant, Capt. Ellery Stone, U.S.N.R., is acting chief commissioner until the appointment of General Mason-MacFarlane's successor.

The Control Commission is divided into four sections, headed by vice presidents of the Control Commission, and six independent subcommissions:

1. Political Section
2. Economic Section
3. Administrative Section
4. Regional Control and Military Government Section
5. Navy Subcommission
6. Army Subcommission
7. Air Subcommission
8. War Material Subcommission
9. Telecommunication Subcommission
10. Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons Subcommission

The Economic Section and the Administrative Section are further divided into subcommissions, as follows:

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION

1. Interior
2. Public Safety
3. Public Health
4. Legal
5. Education

6. Property Control
7. Monuments and Fine Arts

ECONOMIC SECTION

1. Industry and Commerce
2. Labor
3. War Factories
4. Agriculture
5. Food
6. Public Works and Mines
7. Finance
8. Internal Transportation

The Political Section is headed by joint vice presidents, one American and one Englishman: Samuel Reber and Harold Caccia. The Economic Section is headed by Col. William O'Dwyer, American, with the title of Vice President of the Control Commission and personal rank of Minister. The Administrative Section is headed by Air Commodore Lord Stansgate, a British officer, with the title of Vice President of the Control Commission. The Regional Control and Military Government Section is headed by Brig. Maurice Lush, an English Army officer, with the title of Vice President of the Control Commission.

The personnel of the Control Commission is roughly 50 percent American and 50 percent British, the only exceptions being a Soviet and a French representative on the Control Commission attached to the staff of the chief commissioner. The personnel of the Commission was originally entirely military except for the members of the Political Section and a limited number of experts in the Economic Section. It is present policy, however, to assign civilian experts of both nationalities to the Control Commission to relieve the increasing personnel problem and to provide for the time when the Allied military authorities may wish to turn over the function of the Control Commission to civilian agencies of the Allied Governments.

The chief commissioner of the Allied Control Commission is also chief civil-affairs officer for Allied Military Government. Originally Allied Military Government and the Allied Control Com-

¹ Prepared in the Division of Southern European Affairs, Office of European Affairs, Department of State.

mission were separate entities: the former under the direct command of the Theater Commander in Italy, the latter under the Supreme Allied Commander in Algiers. In the reorganization of the Control Commission in January 1944 the headquarters and general staffs of the two organizations were combined and made identical. They are now known as AMG/ACC in Italy. The distinction between the two branches of the now combined organization is briefly that the Allied Military Government functions in territory in the forward areas behind the Allied lines where administration of Allied forces is necessary, while the Allied Control Commission functions in that territory more remote from the front line which it has been possible to restore to Italian administration. Since the beginning of the Italian campaign the Supreme Allied Commander has, upon the recommendation of the Advisory Council for Italy, withdrawn Allied Military Government from and restored to Italian administration the Islands of Sicily and Sardinia and the 15 southern Provinces of the mainland (with the exception of the port of Naples); that is, all territory south of the northern boundaries of the Provinces of Naples and Campobasso. It is contemplated that on August 15 the Provinces of Littoria, Frosinone, and Rome (including the city of Rome) will be added to that territory already restored to Italian administration. The remaining areas behind the Allied lines will be administered directly by Allied Military Government. The Supreme Allied Commander will, however, continue to exercise supreme authority in all of liberated Italy through the Allied Control Commission of which he is president *ex officio*. The relationship of the Control Commission to the Italian Government and to Italian administration in liberated areas is one of supervision and guidance rather than one of direct administration as in the case of Allied Military Government.

The Allied Control Commission for Italy is the organ through which relations between the United Nations and the Italian Government are conducted. Consequently, the relations of the United Nations, including the United States and Great Britain, with the Italian Government are on a military basis.

The Allied Control Commission established itself in Rome on July 15, 1944 at the time the Italian Government returned to the capital.

Mission of Educators

[Released to the press August 5]

A mission of three North American educators leaves on Monday, August 7, by plane for La Paz, Bolivia, at the invitation of the Bolivian Government.

The mission consists of Roy Tasco Davis, director of the Inter-American Schools Service; E. Duncan Grizzell, chairman of the Executive Committee on the Cooperative Study of Secondary School Standards; and John Jacob Seidel, Assistant State Superintendent of Education of Maryland. They will spend six weeks in surveying the public-school system in Bolivia and will make a report on their findings, with appropriate recommendations.

According to the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the work of this mission of educators is "in keeping with the full spirit of continental cooperation which permeates the policy of the American nations." The visiting experts, he says, will "put themselves in contact with the Ministry of Education of Bolivia" in order to study jointly the present educational needs in that country and to "decide how many experts and in what different fields should lend their service to Bolivia." The most pressing immediate problems have to do with educational administration, the organization of normal schools, and the organization of pre-vocational and vocational institutions.

Inter-American Coffee Board

[Released to the press August 5]

Reference is made to the Department's press release 199 of May 30, 1944 concerning the Inter-American Coffee Board which administers the Inter-American Coffee Agreement.¹

The President has now approved the designation of Mr. James H. Wright, Assistant to the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs, Department of State, as this Government's alternate delegate to the Board. Mr. Wright succeeds Mr. Walter N. Walmsley, Jr., in this capacity. Mr. Walmsley, who was formerly Chief of the Division of Brazilian Affairs, has now been assigned to duties away from the Department.

¹ BULLETIN of June 3, 1944, p. 512.

Agreement With Canada Regarding Certain Defense Installations

Statement by THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA

[Released to the press August 1]

A statement by the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King, regarding reimbursement to the United States for defense facilities constructed in Canada, follows:

"I wish to lay on the table an exchange of notes dated June 23, 1944 between the Canadian Ambassador in Washington and the Secretary of State of the United States, constituting an agreement under which the Canadian Government undertakes to reimburse the United States Government for certain works which the latter have constructed in Canada. It covers also certain United States expenditures at the base constructed by Canada at Goose Bay in Labrador.¹

"The Minister of Munitions and Supply informed the House in February of the Government's decision to reimburse the United States Government for permanent improvements which they had made to airfields on the northwest staging route and in the northwest generally. Then in April the Minister of Finance stated that as part of an understanding which he had reached with the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States in connection with The Hyde Park Declaration, the Canadian Government would reimburse the United States Government for permanent improvements which they have made to other airfields in Canada and for the telephone line from Edmonton to the Alaska boundary which was also built by the United States. The exchange of notes which I have tabled is an agreement between the two Governments on this subject and, with its appendices, goes into considerable detail as to the amounts spent in various localities.

"It has been agreed that Canada will reimburse the United States to the extent of 76.8 million dollars (United States funds). This covers construction costs incurred by the United States Government on works of permanent value on the northwest staging route, the flight strips along the Alaska Highway, the flight strips along the Mackenzie River, the airfields in northeastern Canada, the airfield at Mingan, Quebec, the airfield at Goose Bay, Labrador, and the telephone line from Ed-

monton to the Alaska boundary. An additional 13.8 million dollars spent by the United States on these projects is not being repaid by Canada since, while necessary for the prosecution of the war, it represents wartime expenditure for United States purposes and provides nothing of permanent value—for example, temporary barracks and other housing facilities. However, all these works, whether of permanent or non-permanent value, are relinquished to the Canadian Government and it is I am sure a source of satisfaction to both Governments that a specific agreement has been reached regarding the disposition of these facilities.

"I should also point out that in addition to reimbursing the United States for the outlays under reference Canada has assumed substantial expenditures for the construction of wartime facilities which were originally made on the understanding that we would be reimbursed by the United States. Our expenditures under this head in Canadian funds will total 34.7 million dollars. Thus including our reimbursements to the United States and the expenditures which we are making ourselves the amount expressed in Canadian dollars which the Canadian Government is spending on the airfields and related projects mentioned in the exchange of notes is of the order of 120 million dollars.

"Members will observe that all of the foregoing expenditures were incurred in connection with defence installations in northwestern and northeastern Canada. Both are vital areas in the joint defence plans of the United States and Canada. Through the permanent joint board on defence far-reaching defence measures have been taken to close these back doors of the continent against attack by Germany and Japan. In concept and in execution the defence plans for these areas represent one of the most effective examples of co-operation among the United Nations. At the same time these facilities have become links in the offensive plans of the Allies. Planes fly across the north-

¹ BULLETIN of July 30, 1944, p. 127.

west to the Pacific theatre of war and across the northeast to Europe.

"Considerable information has already been given to the House and to the public about the Northwest staging route, but for reasons of security little information about the northeast staging route has so far been made available.

"The need for a northeast staging route was originally suggested to Canada by the United Kingdom Government in August 1940, with the suggestion that the matter be discussed with the United States. Long-range bombers were already being ferried across the Atlantic through the Newfoundland Airport at Gander, but this airport was congested and there were no facilities for ferrying short-range bombers or fighters which were beginning to come off United States assembly lines in considerable volume. Following discussions between Canada and the United States the United States proceeded to investigate the possibilities of establishing airfields in Greenland while Canada proceeded to reconnoitre Labrador. In June 1941, Mr. Eric Fry of the Topographical Survey, who had been seconded to the Royal Canadian Air Force, discovered an ideal site at Goose Bay, North West River, and a preliminary survey was made. A United States Army Air Force party subsequently examined and recommended the site. By agreement with the Government of Newfoundland construction was begun by Canada almost immediately and the field was in use before winter closed in.

"It was subsequently agreed by the Governments of Newfoundland and of the United Kingdom that Canada should be given a ninety-nine year lease to Goose Air Base for defence purposes; that this air base should be available to the Royal Air Force and to the United States Air Forces for the duration of the war and for such time thereafter as the parties might agree to be necessary or advisable in the interests of common defence; that the question of civil air use should remain over for settlement after the war, but that in any event civil and military aircraft owned by the Government of Newfoundland should have rights to use the base on terms not less favourable than aircraft owned by the Government of Canada.

"In the meantime, the United States, by agreement with the Danish Minister at Washington, had in April 1941 assumed responsibility for the

defence of Greenland and had begun constructing airfields there which were to be available to other 'American nations', which included Canada. Shortly afterwards the United States also made an agreement with Iceland for the defence of that island, and airfields were rapidly constructed there. With the completion of Goose Airfield and the Greenland and Iceland fields, a staging route was available for relatively short-range aircraft.

"With the entry of the United States into the war on December 7, 1941, the strain on the existing ferry routes became even heavier. In May 1942 the United States Army Air Force proposed to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence the establishment of air routes over northeastern Canada to ferry long, medium and short-range aircraft to Europe. From the factories of the United States Pacific Coast aircraft would be ferried across the Canadian prairies to the Pas and Churchill. From this Hudson Bay port planes would fly to Southampton Island, Frobisher Bay, Greenland and Iceland and from there to their destination. Planes from another great focal point of United States aircraft production in the midwest States would fly across Ontario and Quebec to Fort Chimo on Ungava Bay at the northernmost tip of Quebec and from there would link up with the other northeast air route at Frobisher.

"These two channels were to be in addition to the ferry route already established to the United Kingdom via Goose Bay, Greenland and Iceland.

"Another purpose for the speedy construction of the route was to permit forces from interior points to be rushed to the defence of Greenland and Iceland should the occasion arise. While this defensive phase of the war now seems remote Members will recall that in the summer of 1941 the German Battleship *Bismarck* operated in this area, and, as is also well known, the Germans established weather stations on different occasions in Greenland.

"On June 9, 1942, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence approved of the proposal of the United States Army Air Force. It recommended immediate construction of the proposed airfields on Canadian territory, either by the Canadian Government or by the United States Government with the approval of the Canadian Government. Facilities of the new routes were to be made available to the Royal Air Force.

"For several reasons the Hudson Bay leg of the northeast route has not been used to the extent anticipated and the original plans were never completely implemented. As the submarine menace was mastered there was a parallel improvement in the shipping situation, permitting the transportation of more aircraft by ship. Increased facilities at Goose Air Base and at Newfoundland airports permitted a greater flow of aircraft through these fields. Amazing technological advances, which increased the flying range and reliability of aircraft, as well as improved meteorological services, made the route from Goose Air Base more serviceable for short-range planes. The successful Allied landing in North Africa made it possible for aircraft used in this area to be flown over the southern route, thus relieving the pressure on the northern route. As the fortunes of the United Nations rose in the North Atlantic theatre the threat of enemy action against the northeastern section of this Continent diminished.

"In reaching this agreement for repayment for expenditures incurred for these defence facilities in northwestern and northeastern Canada and Labrador, the Government had two considerations in mind. In the first place, it believed that, as part of the Canadian contribution this country should take general responsibility for the provision of facilities in Canada and in Labrador required for the use of Canadian, United Kingdom and United States Forces. In the second place, it was thought that it was undesirable that any other country should have a financial investment in improvements of permanent value, such as civil aviation facilities for peacetime use in this country. I am happy to say that our views on this subject were understood by the Government of the United States and the agreement which I have tabled is the result of this understanding."

Visit of Mexican Mycologist

Dr. Antonio González Ochoa, chief of the Laboratory of Mycology at the Institute of Public Health and Tropical Diseases in Mexico City, is a guest of the Department of State for several months' study, observation, and research on mycological work in the United States. He will

confer with specialists in tropical medicine at the National Institute of Health in Bethesda, Maryland, and at Duke and Stanford Universities.

Dr. González Ochoa has made valuable contributions to the increasing scientific knowledge about mycology, the study of fungi, and to methods of combating diseases arising from fungus infection.

Birthday of the King Of Norway

[Released to the press August 4]

The President has sent the following message to His Majesty Haakon VII, of Norway:

THE WHITE HOUSE, August 3, 1944.

It gives me pleasure to express to you on this anniversary of Your Majesty's birthday the congratulations and best wishes of the people of the United States as well as my own felicitations and greetings on the occasion.

FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT

Return of George B. Cressey From China

[Released to the press August 5]

Dr. George B. Cressey has just returned from China, where he served as visiting professor under the Department of State's program of cultural relations. Professor Cressey has been on leave of absence from Syracuse University where he is chairman of the Department of Geology and Geography. He also served in China as the representative of the National Academy of Sciences and carried the greetings of many American scholarly organizations.

During his stay in China Professor Cressey visited nearly thirty universities and research institutions in the vicinity of Chungking, Chengtu, Kunming, Kweiyang, Kweilin, and as far east as Foochow on the Pacific. On his way to China last fall he spent a month in India where he studied university problems at a dozen centers.

Special War Problems Division

By GRAHAM H. STUART¹

REPRESENTATION OF FOREIGN INTERESTS

C. THE REPATRIATION UNIT

General principles and problems

We have already discussed the work of repatriation of nationals before the United States entered the war, a function performed by the Welfare Section,² the repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war by the Internees Section,³ and certain negotiations regarding the repatriation of foreign diplomats and consuls by the Enemy Interests Unit of the Representation Section.⁴ Repatriation in its various aspects has been one of the most important activities of the Special War Problems Division. The Repatriation Unit proper has the responsibility of making the necessary arrangements for the repatriation of nationals of the United States and its Allies and associates from enemy territory and the repatriation of enemy nationals from the territories of the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere upon the basis of an equable and reciprocal exchange.

The desire for repatriation is a very keen one, on the part not only of the individual concerned but also of his relatives and friends. Since everyone seeking repatriation cannot be accommodated simultaneously, the compilation of lists of the persons to be repatriated, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances pertinent to a fair and just evaluation, requires thorough investigation, careful consideration, and balanced judgment. It also requires considerable negotiation and implementation with the enemy and protecting powers and the governments of the American

republics and also with the military, naval, and civil security agencies of the United States.

As a preliminary to the act of repatriation the Repatriation Unit maintains a card file of all American citizens known to be residing in enemy territory, whether in Europe or in the Far East, in which is entered all information obtainable indicating the repatriability of the individuals named. This information includes citations to any correspondence between the protecting power and enemy governments in regard to any individual's repatriation. The Far Eastern file contains from 6,500 to 7,000 names of Americans.

Since repatriation after war begins is a two-way street and becomes practically an equivalent exchange of nationals, the Repatriation Unit maintains a similar card index of German, Italian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Rumanian nationals resident in the Western Hemisphere indicating their current repatriation status. That index contains more than 20,000 names.

The Unit has compiled a third file of the individuals of the Japanese race in the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere. That compilation has been one of the most difficult problems facing the Unit. The Japanese alphabet has so many delicate nuances of meaning that Miss Elizabeth B. Smith, who is in charge of this work, has found it necessary to recheck the index innumerable times.⁵ The information received by the Unit from Japanese sources regarding the priority lists of Japanese to be repatriated was both incomplete and inaccurate, and many months' meticulous work was required to make them usable. The Unit today has a list in both Japanese and English characters of 100,000 names, with their correct addresses, and with the necessary information concerning their identification, whereabouts, and repatriability. In fact, this is the only agency which has correlated *all* the information available on individuals of the Japanese race in the United States. As such it has become an invaluable source of information for the other agencies of the Federal Government

¹ This is the fourth in a series of articles on the Special War Problems Division by Dr. Stuart, Consultant in the Division of Research and Publication, Office of Public Information, Department of State.

² BULLETIN of July 2, 1944, p. 6.

³ BULLETIN of July 16, 1944, p. 63.

⁴ BULLETIN of July 30, 1944, p. 115.

⁵ With War Relocation Authority, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Provost Marshal General's Office, Office of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Alien Enemy Control, Census Bureau, and Selective Service.

regarding the loyalty and identity of persons of the Japanese race.

Perhaps one of the most troublesome problems facing the Unit is that of deciding which Americans are to be brought home. The Unit received innumerable letters from Congressmen, officials of the administration, and the general public urging the repatriation of specific individuals. However, as behooves a democratic system, the Government of the United States, recognizing that all American citizens have an equal right to consideration, refused to select individual Americans for inclusion in exchanges or to discriminate in any other way among individual Americans desiring repatriation. It was necessary nevertheless to give the Swiss representatives in charge of American interests in enemy countries certain directives based upon broad humanitarian grounds to aid them in meeting the exchange quotas. In the case of the exchanges with Germany, except for the repatriation of Government officials, the United States made no demands of a specific character. The Swiss made up the lists of Americans largely according to the wishes and availability of the persons to be repatriated. The situation of non-official internees under Japanese control made it advisable however, for humanitarian reasons, to single out certain groups for priority. The directives which were set up to govern repatriation from the Far East in 1943 gave preference to (1) those under close arrest; (2) interned women and children; (3) the seriously ill; and (4) interned men, with preferences being given, other things being equal, to married men long separated from their families in the United States. For subsequent Far Eastern repatriation, unaccompanied interned women and children had absolute first priority. The next to be considered were the seriously sick and seriously wounded, whether civilian or military, and those under close arrest. Any remaining space was to be filled by those least likely to withstand the rigors of continued internment.

Exchange of official personnel

With the entry of the United States into the war, plans had to be made for the exchange of official and non-official nationals of the United States and other countries in the Western Hemisphere, including Canada, with the nationals of the Axis countries. Since most of the Latin American republics broke diplomatic relations with the Axis

powers immediately after Pearl Harbor, the United States sent a circular telegram to all its diplomatic missions in the other American republics stating that the United States would be glad to include in the arrangements which it was making for the exchange of its own diplomatic and consular representatives in Axis countries any of the official personnel of the other American republics which had broken or might subsequently break relations with the Axis powers. The Department assumed the initiative in this matter in a spirit of cooperation and in view of the fact that transportation facilities were more readily available to this Government for the successful execution of such an exchange. The nationals of the other American republics and Canada were extended equal treatment *pari passu* with American nationals.

The Special Division, as it was then called, had charge of all the negotiations pertaining to the exchange. The original proposal of December 19, 1941, to Germany covered the type of personnel to be included and the procedure to be employed. In substance, the German-American exchange agreement provided for the exchange of all nationals whether interned or not¹ with the proviso that either Government might exceptionally withhold from the exchange any national of the other whose release might be considered inimical to its national interests. The Japanese-American exchange agreement provided for the exchange of all nationals (except certain permanent residents), without regard to their number or possible usefulness in the prosecution of the war. Subsequent arrangements provided that the exchanges should cover Latin American diplomats who were being exchanged with the Axis countries as well as those from the United States.

The principal difficulties in carrying out the arrangements seemed to be the procurement of suitable vessels and an agreement concerning the inclusion of certain non-official persons. For example, Germany requested 50 prominent German civilians to be exchanged with the diplomatic transport. The United States was willing to re-

¹ In all cases of repatriation of non-officials, it is required that men between the ages of 18 and 50 sign a pledge not to bear arms again for the duration of the present war. Anyone violating this pledge is subject to court-martial if recaptured.

patriate all non-official Germans, but it insisted that certain persons might be retained for reasons of national security. The German Government objected to this limitation, but the United States was insistent and did not yield its point. Other points of dispute arose when the Japanese wanted their officials to proceed to third countries, contrary to the interests of the United States and when the United States wished to receive as official personnel the American military legion guards and Marine detachments from China. Neither of these desiderata was attained.

The long delay before the first exchange was finally consummated—approximately four months—was caused partly by the lack of direct communications. For example, an average of 18 days was required for a reply from Germany or Japan through the channels of the protecting power even though the reply did not require much reflection on the part of the enemy government. The negotiations were also delayed by the fact that the United States had to deal, in one way or another, with every government in the Western Hemisphere and all except a few governments in Europe and Asia. Finally, the negotiations were hampered by a lack of shipping, particularly on the west coast of South America, which delayed the arrival in the United States of the Axis diplomatic missions from Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador.

In the repatriation of German citizens the German Government requested (1) that German citizens from the other Americas be repatriated first; (2) that Germans interned before the outbreak of the war should come next; and (3) that all internees were to have preference over those at liberty. The Special Division had to check all official lists, both those compiled of Germans in the United States and, with the help of the Passport Division, those of Americans in Germany. It also had to prepare a list of all Germans detained or interned in the United States who wished to return home and to obtain the approval of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Alien Enemy Control Unit, Department of Justice, for their repatriation.

¹ On its way over from Sweden, arriving in New York on June 9, 1942, the *Gripsholm* brought 194 Americans and alien relatives still remaining in Sweden in return for our promise that we would reciprocate to the vessel's capacity on her return to Göteborg.

The United States chartered the Swedish steamship *Drottningholm* to serve as the exchange vessel. On its trip from Göteborg, Sweden, on April 19, 1942, under safe-conduct of all belligerent governments, it brought to the United States 114 American citizens stranded in Sweden since 1940. The Swiss Government consented to act as guarantor for compliance with the terms of the agreement reached by the various governments concerned for the exchange of Axis and American diplomats and nationals. The Portuguese Government consented to act for all governments concerned as guarantor for the exchange operation on Portuguese territory. When the *Drottningholm* sailed from New York on May 7, 1942 its passenger list of 948 comprised 652 German, Italian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian officials from the United States and 215 German and Italian officials from Latin American countries. The remaining 81 passengers were German non-officials. On its return trip from Lisbon on June 1, 1942 the *Drottningholm* brought back 133 American officials and 46 Latin American officials. On the same trip were included 561 American non-officials and 169 Latin American non-officials.

To safeguard national interests the responsible security agencies had rightly taken the stand that no one should be repatriated who might be of assistance to the enemy, intellectually or physically. This position, fully supported by the Department of State, made it increasingly difficult to find an adequate passenger list for the second exchange with Germany. When Germany refused safe-conduct for the vessel unless it changed its port of call in the United States to an American port specifically designated by Germany to fit in with the extension of her submarine campaign in the North Atlantic, it was decided, with the approval of the Chief Executive, to terminate the European exchanges at least for the time being. When the next European exchange was made in 1944 the security and military authorities considered that developments in the war had reduced the dangers of such repatriation movements.

In the case of the Japanese official personnel the Swedish motorship *Gripsholm*¹ served as the exchange vessel from New York to Lourenço Marques in Portuguese Africa. The Japanese Government utilized one of its own vessels, the *Asama Maru*, which sailed from Japan and stopped at Saigon, and an Italian vessel, the *Conte Verde*,

with an Italian crew, to carry the American repatriates from Shanghai and Hong Kong.

An even greater delay than in the case of the European exchange occurred because of the non-receipt of the list of Americans to be repatriated from China and the refusal of the Japanese Government to grant safe-conduct to the *Gripsholm* until June 16. When the *Gripsholm* sailed from New York on June 18, 1942 there were on board approximately 495 Japanese and Thai officials, as well as 602 non-official Japanese and Thais. According to the arrangements the vessel was to call en route at Rio de Janeiro to take on board approximately 403 additional Japanese official and non-official nationals from Brazil and Paraguay. Thus, a total of about 1,500 persons were transported by the American exchange vessel on its first voyage to Lourenço Marques.

The first exchange with Japan brought about the repatriation of 1,378 nationals of the United States of whom 288 were officials; 104 Latin Americans; 71 Canadians and 1 Spaniard, making a total of 1,554 persons. The majority of non-officials included in this exchange came from Japan, the remote areas of China under Japanese control, and Hong Kong.

Second exchange with Japan

A second exchange with Japan was expected to follow immediately after the first, but long delays resulted. The Japanese resented the publication of atrocity stories recounted by Americans returned from the Far East, and undoubtedly they felt that the statements concerning America's war effort made by returning Japanese undermined to some extent the Japanese war effort. The Japanese Government also attempted to interpret the agreement to repatriate the Manila group of Foreign Service officers as covering only officers formally stationed at Manila. The United States rejected in strong terms this interpretation. Another delaying factor was the difficulty in identifying and locating the Japanese requested by the Japanese Government.

The Department's position was laid down in a telegram to Bern, dated April 20, 1942. In this communication the Department stated that in agreeing to the repatriation of non-official persons the United States "accepted the Japanese proposal that all includable persons be exchanged without question of their usefulness for the prosecution of

the war and contemplated proposing no limitation upon repatriation of persons because of their military age." The Department followed an identical policy in its telegram of July 29, 1942 to proceed with the second exchange, and the Japanese accepted on the same basis as the first, which the Special Division interpreted to mean that the United States was obligated to repatriate, without exception, all persons specifically named by the Japanese Government unless such persons refused repatriation.¹ In attempting to do so, however, great difficulties were encountered. The Japanese Government's priority list, which had been made up, evidently from memory, on board the *Gripsholm* by the returning Japanese officials, contained thousands of names, many of which were incorrectly spelled and of which the addresses given were inexact. Since many of the names had not previously been suggested for repatriation they were unknown to the Special Division. The most expeditious procedure was to obtain Japanese acceptance of a list of passengers whose identity, whereabouts, and willingness to be repatriated were already known.

Successive passenger lists suggested and submitted to the Japanese Government on the basis of identified Japanese who were willing to be repatriated were rejected by Japan on the ground that certain Japanese requested by Japan were not included. Furthermore, Japan refused to believe that so many, more than 3,000 out of 5,000, of those named by her for repatriation refused the opportunity when offered.

Another factor which may have affected the Japanese attitude was the change of ministry which occurred in the Japanese Government in September 1942, when a certain Masayuki Tani, who was reported to hold the militaristic point of view, was placed in charge of the Japanese Foreign Office. During his incumbency there was manifest a disinclination to proceed with the second exchange, and it was not before he left office in the spring of 1943 that the Special Division was able to proceed with some hope of effecting the second exchange.

It was finally decided to ask the Japanese again to state precisely whom in the light of all difficul-

¹This policy was based on the fact that Americans in the hands of the Japanese were in a less favorable position physically than those in the power of the European enemies.

ties encountered they wished exchanged, hoping thus to obtain information that would enable us to meet Japan's wishes. A note worded so as to permit a flexible interpretation brought a rather favorable reply from the Japanese. After a year of disappointing delays the State Department was in a position to proceed with some hope of success. Numerous details yet remained to be worked out, but as a result of the whole-hearted cooperation of all agencies, growing out of a meeting in the Department on August 19, 1943, the *Gripsholm* was able to leave on its second exchange voyage (this time to Mormugão, Portuguese India) on September 2, 1943.¹

It is possible that the delay in effecting the second exchange made more difficult the possibility of future exchanges with the Japanese. More important is the fact that the delay undoubtedly caused much suffering among American prisoners of war in Japanese custody, whose lives, in many instances, probably depended upon the medicine that could be obtained only on the exchange vessels. However, the experience gained by the Department may yet prove of the greatest value. Since the return of the *Gripsholm* from the second exchange the State Department has been persistently attempting to negotiate a third exchange. Accurate information is now on file regarding practically all Japanese willing to accept repatriation, numbering more than 9,000. The officials of the Special War Problems Division hope that as the demand for manpower increases, the Japanese Government may again be willing to carry on negotiations for further exchange of its nationals.

Other exchanges with Germany

The *Drottningholm*, on its second voyage from New York, repatriated 950 non-officials, of which 819 were Germans; 120 Italians; 6 Bulgarians; 5 Rumanians; and 10 Hungarians. On its return trip it brought back 785 North Americans and 157 Latin Americans. On its third trip to Lisbon, June 3, 1942, the *Drottningholm* carried 646 Germans, 124 Italians, 2 Hungarians, and 43 Swedish, a total of 815. Two other vessels were used to repatriate German non-officials, the *Nyassa*, June 13, 1942, and the *Serpa Pinto*, July 3, 1942, which together took over 351.

¹ On its second voyage the *Gripsholm* took over 1,507 Japanese and brought back the same number of nationals from North and South America, including 221 Canadians.

No other exchanges with Germany were made before the spring of 1944 when the *Gripsholm* repatriated 1,145 Germans and 18 French officials and brought back 533 Americans and 95 Latin Americans. On this last exchange a considerable number of the passengers were being repatriated on humanitarian grounds because of serious illness or because they were seriously wounded prisoners of war. No arrangements have yet been concluded for further group exchanges with Germany, although negotiations are under way. In the meantime, a small number of civilians are being included in current exchanges of seriously sick and wounded prisoners of war.

The total number of Americans who have been repatriated from Europe up to April 1, 1944 has been 2,361 and from the Far East, 3,080. In return, 4,176 nationals of the European Axis powers have been sent back to Europe and 2,950 Japanese nationals have been repatriated to Japan.

The removal of subversive aliens from the other American republics

Within a short time after the entrance of the United States into the World War the Latin American republics, with the exception of Argentina and Chile, either broke relations with or declared war upon the Axis powers. At the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, held in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942, several resolutions were passed which aimed at combating the subversive activities of enemy aliens and an Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense was set up at Montevideo. This Committee adopted a resolution drafted by the Department of Justice in consultation with the Special Division and the Division of American Republics in the Department of State. The resolution was presented by the American member of the Committee, which recommended to the governments of the American republics the need for the adequate detention of dangerous Axis nationals and for the deportation of such persons to another American republic for detention when adequate local detention facilities were lacking.

The Department, as well as other agencies of the Government, including the Departments of War, Navy, and Justice, felt that the presence of large numbers of dangerous and potentially dangerous Germans, Italians, and Japanese in the

countries to the south was a serious threat to continental safety. These aliens had access to communication facilities, to mines engaged in producing essential materials, to public-utility power plants, and to wharves and harbor facilities used by our shipping in the transportation of defense materials. Because of the political influence exerted by many of these aliens, measures of strict control could hardly be hoped for. The safest procedure was to remove as many of these aliens as possible, either by repatriation to their homelands or by bringing them to the United States where adequate internment facilities to take care of large groups of alien enemies had been prepared.

As an aid to repatriation the United States, in its negotiations with enemy governments for the repatriation of nationals, provided for the inclusion of the nationals of all other American governments which might be interested. All but three—Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay—of the Latin American republics which had broken with the Axis took advantage of our exchange agreement with the European Axis powers. By this means, some 2,000 German and Italian nationals who were regarded as dangerous enemy aliens were returned to Europe on the three voyages of the *Drottningholm* and on the two supplementary sailings of neutral vessels.

In addition to this exchange procedure, the United States has provided, at its own expense, facilities for the transportation of any Axis nationals who might be under consideration for deportation to this country and for their accommodation once they arrive here.¹

The Special War Problems Division handles all arrangements regarding the transportation of alien enemies from the other American republics deported for internment in the United States. They have been transported to the United States by the following means: Army transports, Army air transports, commercial airlines, and Chilean commercial steamship lines. The majority of the

alien enemies have been transported to the United States by Army transports, the use of which has been limited to cases where the removal of a particular group of alien enemies is considered urgent.

The use of commercial lines for the transportation of alien enemies has been confined mainly to the families of potentially dangerous men already interned in the United States. By use of such transportation, the individuals have been transported from time to time in small groups as space became available.

On two occasions space on Chilean passenger vessels proceeding to the United States has been used for the transportation of alien enemies and their families from Peru. This means was not continued because, toward the end of June 1943, the passenger vessels on the run from Santiago to New Orleans were taken over by the United States Maritime Commission.

The cooperation received from the other American republics has varied according to the local laws and the national policy of each country. The belligerent republics of the Caribbean area have sent us subversive aliens without limitation concerning their disposition. Peru has followed a similar policy. On the other hand Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico have insisted upon explicit guarantees before turning over aliens for repatriation.

The success of the repatriation program may be gaged from the results which have been obtained. The total number of enemy aliens brought to the United States from South and Central America is 4,707, of which 2,584 have been repatriated, and 2,118 are interned in the United States. In regard to security this means that the Japanese colonies in many states have been virtually eliminated and the local German organizations substantially disorganized.

¹ Potentially dangerous alien enemies brought to the United States for internment are not "entered" into the United States under the provisions of immigration laws of this country and are subject to deportation proceedings at the conclusion of the war.

TREATY INFORMATION

Agricultural Experiment Station In Guatemala

On July 15, 1944 the American Ambassador in Guatemala and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Guatemala signed a memorandum of understanding providing for the establishment and operation of an agricultural experiment station in Guatemala.

The agreement provides, in part, for the development of tropical agriculture in general, and, specifically, for the promotion of the cinchona industry in Guatemala. The Government of Guatemala agrees to provide certain lands, laboratory and office space, farm implements, Guatemalan assistants, and unskilled labor as may be essential to conduct the work of the experiment station. The Government of the United States agrees to provide the services of scientists, scientific journals, equipment, and apparatus, and land motor vehicles, subject to the availability of such vehicles in the United States, in order to carry out the purposes of the experiment station. Provision is made for the training of certain approved Guatemalan students on problems pertaining to cinchona.

The agreement provides that it "shall come in force on the day of signature and shall continue in force for a period of ten years unless either of the Governments shall fail to provide the funds necessary for its execution in which event it may be terminated on written notice by either Government."

Convention on the Pan American Union

Bolivia

The Director General of the Pan American Union informed the Secretary of State, by a letter of July 27, 1944, of the deposit with the Pan American Union on July 24, 1944 of the instrument of

ratification by the Government of Bolivia of the Convention on the Pan American Union signed at Habana on February 20, 1928 at the Sixth International Conference of American States (*Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Sixth International Conference of American States*, Government Printing Office, 1928, pp. 231-238).

The instrument of ratification is dated October 20, 1943.

Pan American Highway

Bolivia

The Director General of the Pan American Union informed the Secretary of State, by a letter of July 27, 1944, of the deposit with the Pan American Union on July 24, 1944 of the instrument of ratification by the Government of Bolivia of the Convention on the Pan American Highway signed at Buenos Aires on December 23, 1936 at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace (Treaty Series 927).

The instrument of ratification is dated October 20, 1943.

Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations

Bolivia

The Director General of the Pan American Union informed the Secretary of State, by a letter of July 27, 1944, of the deposit with the Pan American Union on July 24, 1944 of the instrument of ratification by the Government of Bolivia of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations signed at Buenos Aires on December 23, 1936 at the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace (Treaty Series 928).

The instrument of ratification is dated October 20, 1943.

Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic

Dominican Republic

The American Embassy at Ciudad Trujillo informed the Department by a despatch of July 20, 1944 that the Dominican Government has ratified the Convention on the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic, which was opened for signature at the Pan American Union on December 15, 1943. The convention was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on June 21, 1944 and by the Senate on June 27, 1944 and was promulgated by the President on June 29, 1944. The congressional resolution approving the convention, and its promulgation, were published in the Dominican *Gaceta Oficial* of July 11, 1944.

Peru

The Director General of the Pan American Union informed the Secretary of State by a letter of July 28, 1944 that the instrument of ratification by the Government of Peru of the Convention on the Regulation of Inter-American Automotive Traffic was deposited with the Pan American Union on July 25, 1944. The instrument of ratification is dated July 7, 1944.

Corrigendum

Guatemala

BULLETIN of July 23, 1944, page 104, first column, first paragraph, fourth line: Delete "El Salvador" and in lieu thereof insert "Guatemala".

Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences

Bolivia

The Director General of the Pan American Union by a letter of July 17, 1944 informed the Secretary of State that on July 12, 1944 the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of Bolivia in the United States, Señor Don Carlos Dorado Chopitea, signed in the name of his Government the Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, which was opened for signature at the Pan American Union on January 15, 1944.

Nicaragua

The American Embassy at Managua has informed the Department that on June 21, 1944 the

Nicaraguan Congress approved the Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences and that the President ratified the convention on July 18, 1944.

THE DEPARTMENT

Appointment of Officers

Carlisle C. McIvor as Assistant Chief of the Division of World Trade Intelligence, effective July 21, 1944.

Donald R. Heath as Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs, Office of American Republic Affairs, effective July 26, 1944.

Cecil B. Lyon as Assistant Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs, Office of American Republic Affairs, effective July 26, 1944.

Robert F. Woodward as Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs, Office of American Republic Affairs, effective July 26, 1944.

Henry P. Fletcher as Special Adviser to the Secretary of State, on post-war problems and plans, effective July 27, 1944.

Isaiah Bowman as Special Adviser to the Secretary of State, on post-war problems and plans, effective July 27, 1944.

Joseph F. McGurk as Acting Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs, effective July 31, 1944.

PUBLICATIONS

OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

The articles listed below will be found in the August 5 issue of the Department of Commerce publication entitled *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, copies of which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, for 10 cents each:

"Free China's Industry: Recent Salient Trends", based on a report from J. Bartlett Richards, commercial attaché, American Embassy, Chungking.

"Organic Drugs and Chemicals: Markets and Industry in Chile", by R. F. Schneider, economic analyst, American Embassy, Santiago.